measures would nevertheless seem to differ in intent. The older regulations obviously affect the size of a city's population, but they were intended primarily to exclude certain types of people, such as low-income families, immigrants, and minorities. The newer growth control regulations, on the other hand, are directed toward limiting newcomers regardless of their type. 1 The vanguard of the growth control movement were the counties and cities of Northern California. By the end of the 1970s a variety of growth control measures had been adopted in San Francisco, Marin County, Petaluma, San Jose, the Napa Valley, and in several other cities in the area (Glickfeld, Graymer, and Morrison 1987) . Opposition to continued rapid growth subsequently spread to traditionally pro-growth Southern California as well, and by 1988 nearly three-fourths of the cities and counties in the state had enacted at least one growth control measure (Glickfeld and Levine 1991) .
In San Diego, as in other places throughout the state, popular sentiment for curbing growth appears to have been provoked by a sustained period of rapid growth that showed no sign of abating.
A poll taken by the Los Angeles Times in May 1988
found that a large majority (78 percent) of San Diegans supported restrictions on new commercial and residential construction even if it harmed the local economy (Bernstein 1988) . Reflecting popular sentiment, the San Diego City Council adopted an Interim Development Ordinance (IDO) in July 1987. Scheduled to run through the end of 1988, it imposed, with exceptions in certain areas, an overall cap of 8000 residential building permits a year. By this time most other cities in the county, including Chula Vista, Del Mar, El Cajon, Encinitas, Oceanside, Poway, San Marcos, Solana Beach, Vista, Carlsbad, and Escondido, had also approved some type of growth management plan.
Many San Diegans, however, doubted that these measures were placing any binding constraints on growth-an opinion shared by Glickfeld and Levine (1991) .
In California, as in most other states, legislation can be enacted via ballot measures at the state, county or municipal levels (Magleby 1984; Cronin 1989) . Such propositions may be placed on the ballot by governmental authorities, such as state legislatures, city councils, or county boards, in which case they are usually referred to as referenda.
Private citizens may also qualify propositions for the ballot through the initiative process by collecting a requisite number of signatures. 3 In 1988, growth control advocates in San Diego County, organized as Citizens for Limited Growth, collected over 90,000
signatures in qualifying the Rural Preservation and Traffic Control Initiative Ordinance for the November election. Appearing on the ballot as Proposition D, it called for the County to adopt specific quality-of-life standards with respect to traffic, air quality, and solid waste disposal, and stipulated that any proposed change in land use and zoning had to be put before the voters in a referendum. Proposition D proposed to limit new residential building permits in unincorporated areas of the County to 2 percent of the existing housing stock in 1989, with the cap dropping to 1 percent annually from 1990 through 2010. 4 Unincorporated areas of the County that were deemed to be environmentally sensitive, such as canyons, wetlands, and floodplains, would be subject to strict regulations on development and land use. New sewer extensions were also to be restricted. Citizens for Limited Growth also succeeded in placing a companion measure, Proposition J, on the ballot in the City of San Diego. J also called for the adoption of quality-of-life standards, tight limits on new construction within the city, and restrictions on development of environmentally sensitive lands.
The County Board of Supervisors and the Sa.n Diego City Council, while ostensibly maintaining their support for managing the rate of growth, viewed the two propositions as too extreme and decided to oppose them. The Board countered Proposition D at the county level by placing on the ballot a. more moderate alternative, Proposition B. Its restrictions on new construction in unincorporated areas were less severe a.nd were not to la.st a.s long. It a.lso called upon the County to develop policies that would provide a balance between residential, commercial, and industrial uses of property, as well as a regional traffic pla.n: Prnposakto intensify la.nd use would require only an advisory vote of citizens in affected communities, and the only county-wide limit on the pace of new construction was that it was not to exceed SANDAG's five-year growth projections. They refer to this as the "tandem initiative" phenomenon. Not surprisingly, the San Diego City Council followed suit, placing a moderate alternative to J, Proposition H, on the city-wide ballot. It included a provision to protect environmentally sensitive areas, but its quality-of-life guidelines were weaker than those in J. It stipulated only that traffic generated by new development stay within roadway capacity, and that there be adequate public facilities and services at the time of development. Its building caps were higher than those in the measure sponsored by Citizens for Limited Growth, and did not apply to low income housing projects or to housing in designated Redevelopment
Areas. As in the case of Propositions D and B at the county level, if both J and H received over 50 percent of the vote, the proposition receiving the most votes would, for all intents and purposes, supercede the other. The electoral regime that obtained here was thus tantamount to approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978) ; voters could vote for one, both, or neither propositions, but could not rank-order them.
In addition to Proposition B, the Board of Supervisors also placed Proposition C on the ballot. It was intended to serve as a way of officially registering public support for the principle that "certain impacts associated with growth should be resolved on a regional basis." To this end it called for creation of a Regional Planning and Growth Management Review Board to formulate a regional growth management plan. Although C was placed on the ballot as an advisory measure only, it did call upon the Regional Board to be given the authority to require local jurisdictions to adopt whatever legislation was required to implement a regional growth management plan. It also called for the County and for each city in the County to adopt interim development constraints limiting population growth to 75 percent of SANDAG projections until the regional growth management plan was adopted and implemented.
Proposition C won easily, attracting 61 percent of the vote. As it turned out, however, it was the only one of the five growth control measures to be approved. Propositions   D white, suburban homeowners who benefit financially from their enactment (Frieden 1979) . They have instead found little correlation between standard socioeconomic indicators and support for growth controls (Gottdeiner and Neiman 1981; Knapp 1987; Baldassare 1990 ). As Glickfeld and Levine (1991) put it, "It is clear that communities which are passing many growth control measures are not wealthy. While the popular conceptions about the growth control movement is that it is a white, middle-class group of homeowners who are resisting changes in land use, our data, and other research, do not support this interpretation" (pp. 37-8).
Voting data from the 1988 San Diego elections also allow us to investigate the strategic implications of having competing measures on the same ballot. Given the apparently strong support for growth control prior to the election, the sound defeat of all four substantive growth control measures came as something of a surprise. While many observers attributed the outcome to a $2.l million media blitz underwritten by the construction industry and real estate developers, others surmised that the competing measures may have pulled each other down to defeat (Bernstein 1988 
Hypotheses Concerning Preferences for Growth Control

Home Ownership
A major theme of the growth control opponents' campaign in the 1988 San Diego city and county elections was that rents and housing prices would increase dramatically in response to building restrictions, and that few people who did not already own a house would be able to afford one if Propositions Dor J were approved. Indeed, there is a large literature in urban political economy that characterizes the driving up of housing prices not as an unavoidable side effect, but rather as the main point of such exercises (see Donovan and Nieman 1991) . As indicated earlier, Frieden (1979) , Danielson (1976) Several econometric analyses, however, indicate that as a practical matter restrictions of one form or another on housing construction make for higher housing prices.
Positive effects on prices have been found for zoning restrictions (Ohls, Weisberg and Martin 1974) , urban growth boundaries (Knapp 1985) , and limits on new construction (Schwartz, Hansen, and Green 1981) . The most common methodology used in these studies is the comparison of estimated hedonic price functions for housing in areas that are subject to restrictions versus nearby areas that are not. Problems with these analyses arise from the interdependence of adjacent housing markets and from the fact that it is hard to determine whether the statutory constraints imposed by particular growth limitation provision are actually binding. Using data from Davis, California, Schwartz et al. (1986) compare the effects of growth controls estimated with a number of different designs, e.g., pre-test post-test comparisons, post-test comparisons with a control group, pre-test post-test comparison with a control group, etc. They find wide disparities in the estimates, depending on the method used. Those models that they viewed to be theoretically superior, however, produced the strongest and most consistent evidence of·growth controls causing housing •prices to rise. The hypothesis we examine, then, is that homeowners are more likely than renters to support growth controls. This is not to say that appreciation in housing values is the sole or even the primary reason why homeowners would favor adoption of growth controls; indeed, if this were their only motive there are many more direct ways to accomplish this than the complex, multi-faceted measures put before San Diego voters in 1988. But all other things being equal, those who are the likely recipients of a wealth transfer generated by a growth control ordinance should be more supportive of it than those who are the source of the wealth transfer.
Despite the evidence linking restrictions on residential construction with higher home prices, previous studies have hardly yielded an unbroken pattern of support for this hypothesis. DeLeon and Powell (1989) report that renters were actually more supportive than homeowners of San Francisco's 1986 Proposition M, but its building caps applied to downtown office buildings instead of residential housing. Protash and Baldassare (1983) report a sizable correlation between local anti-growth sentiment and percent of owner-occupied housing, but Donovan and Neiman's (1991) regression analysis reveals no relationship between the amount of restrictions on residential development in a locality and levels of home ownership. Both studies, however, were based upon responses to questionnaires mailed out to city planning agencies. Our data on voting on growth control ballot measures should thus provide much more direct evidence as to the relationship between home ownership and anti-growth sentiment.
Traffic Congestion
In comparison to most other urban areas in this country, population densities in Although the rapid increase in traffic in and around San Diego during the 1980s may have been one of the primary causes of widespread dissatisfaction with continued growth, the task we confront in this study is to account for cross-sectional variation in support for growth controls in a particular place at a particular point in time, i.e., San
Diego in November 1988. The hypothesis to be tested here, then, is that people living in areas with high traffic congestion are more likely than residents of low-traffic areas to favor growth control measures.
Ideology
Siegan (1990) and other property-rights theorists typically reject growth controls or other restrictions on land use as inefficient and as an unwarranted intrusion of public authority into the rights of property owners. These views seem to be shared by conservative-minded individuals in the public at large. In a study of opinion data concerning local growth and development in Riverside, California, Gottdiener and Neiman (1981) report that support for the 1979 Proposition R growth control measure tended to line up along the conventional liberal vs. conservative, government intervention vs.
laissez-faire dimension (support for such controls being the liberal position). We would thus expect to find that liberal voters are more supportive of growth control measures than are conservative voters. would hypothesize that such concerns coincided with and reinforced the tendency of generally more liberal voters to be more supportive of growth controls.
Racial and Ethnic Differences
Blacks and Latinos are more dependent than whites upon jobs in the construction industry, so they may perceive that any loss of jobs and economic activity resulting from growth controls would be disproportionately injurious to them. They are also less likely to own their own homes, and would thus be more likely to be on the losing encl of any wealth transfer from renters to homeowners. For these reasons we might find blacks and Latinos to be relatively unsupportive of growth controls. Any such differences would not be clue to the distinctive preferences of blacks and Latinos per se, but would instead be an an artifact of background socioeconomic differences.
\ii/hat is specific to blacks, however, and, to a lesser extent, Latinos, is a history of discrimination in the housing market. A key complaint in the lawsuit filed against the growth control ordinance adopted in Pasadena, California in 1989 (the PRIDE initiative) is that restrictions on new housing "lock in" historical patterns of residential segregation. In either case, whether due to differences in occupation, employment, and homeownership, or to the existence of residential segregation along racial/ethnic lines, we hypothesize black and Latino voters to be less supportive than whites of growth controls.
Most previous studies of growth controls have looked for class-based rather than racially-based differences in support. The findings of those that have, however, are quite mixed. Rolleson (1987) reports that communities with small minority populations relative to surrounding communities are more likely to adopt exclusionary zoning ordinances. She does not, however, present any evidence on growth controls. Glickfeld and Levine (1991) report that a community's racial and ethnic composition, at least in California, is of no value in predicting whether or not it has enacted growth control measures. DeLeon and Powell's (1989) finding that Proposition M in San Francisco fared especially well with blacks and Latinos obviously runs counter to our hypothesis, but as before we think this is clue to the fact that M was concerned with the growth of the downtown business district rather than with residential housing. Finally, we include a dummy variable for the 259 precincts located outside of incorporated cities. As indicated earlier, Propositions D and B were voted on by the entire county, but their building caps and other restrictive provisions applied only to unincorporated areas. We expect that people living in unincorporated areas would be less in favor of growth control, as they would be foregoing a disproportionate amount of the economic benefits that accompany population growth.
With data of this nature, i.e. individual discrete choice events (votes) aggregated to the level ·of ,voting .precincts, the appropriate econometric approach is minimum chi square logit (Maddala 1983 ). The equations we estimate (for the county-level and city-level propositions, respectively) are thus of the following form: Tables 2   and 3 below. The top number in each entry is the estimated coefficient, the number in parentheses below is the standard error.
The results of the county-level equations, reported in Table 2 , strongly support our hypotheses concerning the nature of preferences for growth control. The percent Dukakis term, our indicator of liberal/environmental attitudes, is large and significant in all three equations, and thus consistent with Gottdiener and Nieman's findings.
Larger still a.re the coefficients of the percent black term, which range from -0.92 in the Proposition C equation to -0.68 in the Proposition B equation. Given the logit transformation of the data., a. coefficient of -.92 implies that black voters, everything else equal, were as much as 23 percent less likely than whites to support growth control.
Latinos were apparently less opposed to the growth control measures than were blacks, as the coefficients for this term were considerably smaller and significant in only two of the three equations. We also find strong evidence of the home-owner effect that appears to have been so elusive in previous studies, in that the coefficient of the percent owner-occupied term is positive and significant in all three equations. Coefficients of the traffic congestion measure and the unincorporated area dummy are also in the direction predicted by our hypotheses and statistically significant.
There are, however, some important differences in the results for the various propositions. In particular, several of the coefficients in the Propositions B equation are much smaller than the corresponding coefficients in the equations for Propositions C and D. This is true of the percent owner-occupied term, the percent black term, and the traffic congestion measure. The equation we estimated performs thus better in accounting for voting on the advisory measure C and on the relatively extreme measure D than it did on the more moderate alternative B. This same pattern of inter-equation differences is even starker in the city-level results reported in Table 3 . All coefficients in the equations for Propositions C and J are in the hypothesized direction and many times larger than their respective standard errors. In the equation estimated for the moderate alternative Citizens for Limited Growth obviously knew this, and it is presumably for that reason that they urged their supporters-those for whom J was the most-preferred alternative-to vote strategically against their second-most preferred alternative H. This is referred to as the "first order" strategy in Figure 1 . The only way in which J could have garnered more votes than H was for a sufficient nnmber of its supporters to have adopted this strategy. This strategy, however, necessarily runs the risk of fratricide;
by defeating H but failing to pick up a majority for J, the J supporters would achieve their least-preferred outcome, the status quo. who are favorably disposed to growth control increases steadily as we move right on the issue dimension portrayed in Figure 1 , and correspondingly falls as we move left.
Secondly, we assume that voting on the advisory Proposition C was sincere; C was not competitive with the other measures, and one of its stated purposes was to measure general sentiment concerning growth control.
On the basis of these assumptions, we use the percentage of voters who voted yes on C as an indicator of the underlying level of support for growth control in each precinct.
Consequently we can judge whether or not voting on the moderate alternative H was "distorted" by strategic considerations by looking at how voting on H covaries with voting on C. Specifically, if voting on H were sincere, we would expect support for H to increase directly with support for C. If first-order strategic voting against H occurred we would instead observe a different pattern. In the anti-growth-control region of the issue space support for H would still increase along with support for C, as these precincts should contain relatively few voters with preference ordering (JP; HP; S). As we move right, however, the proportion of these voters, who might choose to vote strategically against H, would steadily increase. As a consequence, support for H would cease to increase along with support for C, and in extreme pro-growth-control precincts support for H could even vary inversely with support for C. 
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Proposition J, in contrast, increases along with support C across the entire distribution of precincts. Figure 1 also portrays "second-order" strategies that other types of voters might have employed to counter strategic voting by J supporters against H. First, those who favor both measures but prefer H to J (H P; J P; S) could strategically vote against their second-preferred alternative J. This strategy, too, runs the risk of fratricide, i.e.
backfire and yield one's least-preferred outcome. Secondly, voters who most prefer the status quo growth rate and thus have preference ordering S P; H P; J may decide to vote for their second-preferred alternative H in order to avoid their least-preferred outcome. The downside risk of this strategy is getting one's second-preferred alternative instead of one's most-preferred. The only voters who are completely devoid of incentives to strategize are those for whom H P; S P; J.11
Although we cannot completely discount the presence of second-order strategic voting, it appears that it occurred far less frequently than the first-order strategizing discussed above. First, the results from the regression equations, as well as the results displayed in Figure 2 , indicate that it was only the pattern of voting on H that was distorted by strategic considerations. And, as noted above, Figure 2 shows that support for J rose monotonically along with support for C across the entire range of precincts.
There is then, no visible sign of strategic voting against J by voters with preference ordering (H P; J P; S). There is also little reason to believe that H received many strategic votes from those with preference ordering S P; H P; J. There certainly was no organized campaign advising pro-growth voters to hold their nose and vote strategically for Proposition H in order to prevent passage of the more extreme measure J.
On the contrary, developers and their allies spent over $2 million trying to persuade San Diegans to vote against all growth-control measures.
The data indicate, then, that support for Proposition J was largely unaffected by strategic considerations, and that it would have failed had it been the only growth- 
/31 should be positive, /32 negative, and the magnitude of /32 would register the extent of strategic voting by .J supporters against H. The problem with this formulation is that if voters voted sincerely on both C and J (which we believe to have been the case), they would both be measures of the same underlying preferences concerning growth-control.
Given the resultant high degree of collinearity between 3C and 3J, we cannot estimate equation 2 without some restrictions on one or both of the parameters. If we can place an upper and lower bound on /31, though, this would put an upper and lower bound on /32 as well, and thus on our estimates of strategic voting.
Fortunately, this is something we can do with a large degree of confidence. Given the location of the various propositions relative to the status quo, it is safe to assume that the percentage of votes for the advisory measure C would have exceeded the percentage ca.st for H even under the the limiting case of purely sincere voting on H. As we move left a.long the dimension portrayed in Figure 1 , furthermore, we would expect sincere support for H to rise less rapidly than support for C. This means that /31 in equation 2
should be no larger than 1. Given its greater distance from the status quo, J, in turn, would also receive a lower percentage than C, as well as a lower percentage than H. As we move left a.long the dimension portrayed in Figure 1 , support for J should also rise less rapidly than support for C, but also less rapidly than the sincere component of support for H. This means that if we were to regress %J onto 3C, the slope coefficient should be less than /31 in equation 2.
Because voting on J does not appear to have been significantly affected by strategic considerations, we can in fact run this regression and find that 3J = -.12 + .833C 
In equation 3 f32 equals -.50, and in 4 it equals -.39, implying that between 39 percent and 50 percent of the voters who voted for Proposition J voted strategically against Proposition I-I. Given that J received 41 percent of the vote, we calculate that strategic voting by J supporters against I-I cost I-I at least 16 percent of the vote and thus prevented its adoption. Although fratricide was not responsible for the defeat of J, it was responsible for the defeat of I-I.
Discussion
Our analyses of voting on growth controls in the City and County of San Diego
County in 1988 confirm the findings of previous studies that voters with liberal/environmentalist political leanings are more supportive of such measures. In contrast to previous research efforts, however, we also find support for the view that preferences over growth control are a function of material interests. Whites were much more supportive of the various growth control propositions than were blacks and Latinos, and homeowners were considerably more likely to favor them than were renters. To be sure, one reason why many previous studies in these area failed to find these differences is that they simply did not look for them. Another major reason for our more positive findings, however, is that we were investigating variations in support within a single county or city jurisdiction. Most previous studies, in contrast, were seeking to determine whether or not socioeconomic differences among cities accounted for their differential propensity to enact growth control measures. In short, they were looking for interjurisdictional
variation, while what we find is intrajurisdictional variation. As indicated earlier, we do not interpret our findings to imply that growth controls are only the latest in a long line of ploys homeowners have favored as a way of fostering appreciation in housing values. What we think it does mean is that individuals who receive a wealth transfer as a consequence of some policy, whatever else they might think about the policy, are more likely to support it.
Our findings also demonstrate that voting on ballot measures can be dramatically affected by the presence of another, competing proposition concerning the same issue.
In particular, the defeat of Proposition H, the less stringent alternative sponsored by the City Council, resulted from supporters of Proposition J voting strategically against it.
Although this may seem to be merely another example of a group stubbornly refusing to settle for half a loaf and so getting none, such a judgment is much too facile. First, as our analysis has demonstrated, the supporters of J were in a strategic bind; opposing H ran the risk of being stuck with the status quo, but not opposing H absolutely guaranteed the failure of J. There was also plenty of reason a priori to believe that their strategy would be successful. As indicated earlier, public opinion polls in San Diego in 1988
were evincing strong anti-growth sentiment. The history of previous cases of competing growth control measures also suggested they had a good chance; in five of ten cases of "tandem propositions" identified by Glickfeld, Graymer, and Morrison (1987) , the measure favored by the citizen's group had won while the alternative backed by the city council had failed (in one case both measures passed). If J had been a bit more popular with the voters, the strategy of opposing H would have been successful as well.
For growth-control supporters, the failure to pass any of the binding growth control ordinances in 1988 has also been made more palatable by a subsequent decline in construction activity in San Diego County. Although it was probably not anticipated, this slowdown has substantially reduced the status quo rate of growth~at least for the time being. In contrast to the nearly 45,000 permits for new housing units issued in San Diego County in 1986, less than 16,000 were issued in 1990. According to Caltrans, completion of some key highway projects has also reduced traffic delays on some of the major downtown arteries. Finally, and probably most importantly, failure to pass growth-control measures in 1988 in no way precluded efforts to do so in the future, According to a report issued by the San Diego Association of Governments (1987) , the County could expect the annual rate of population growth to exceed 4 percent through 1995.
3. In the City of San Diego the number of signatures required to put a measure on the ballot is 10 percent of the total number of registered voters in the previous general election. In the County the minimum required is 10 percent of the total number of votes cast in the previous general election. 7. Navarro and Carson (1991) point out that housing price increases associated with growth controls may also reflect higher "amenity" values brought about by the controls, due to such things as less traffic congestion, less degradation in municipal services, and lower housing density. The price increases thus arise from an upward shift in the demand curve instead of a downward shift in the supply curve.
8. The 1986 San Francisco initiative also mandated job training program for city residents and made the provision of more affordable housing a key to the approval of future downtown development projects.
9. The formula Caltrans uses is \! X DX Q X Cve.~peed -3 1 5 ), where V equals the total number of vehicles traversing the affected portion of freeway, D the duration of the delay period, and Q the length of the freeway segment experiencing delay. Because Caltrans chooses the length of freeway on an ad hoc basis, we divide their measure by Q to create a per-mile measure of vehicle-hour delay. See Wilson (1991) for an analysis of the relationship between highway speed, volume, and congestion.
10. Rothstein (1991) develops a theoretical framework for estimating the preferences of setters (those who place referenda on the ballot) and voters with aggregate data. His method, however, requires interjurisdictional data, and assumes that one setter in each jurisdiction places one proposal on the ballot. Rothstein's approach is thus far more suited to the type of situations modeled by Romer and Rosenthal (1979) than to the situation analyzed in this paper. Lupia (1990) examines situations in which voters face multiple competing proposals on the same ballot, but does not examine the strategic consequences of this situation.
11. These various strategies all reduce to a decision whether or not to cast a vote for one's second-preferred alternative. Besides depending upon beliefs about what strategies other voters are following and the consequent likelihood of different outcomes, this decision also depends upon the voter's utility over the three alternatives. For example, if there is a large gap between the utility a voter receives from a most-preferred Voting on Growth Control Measures alternative but little utility difference between the remaining, inferior alternatives, it will be very unlikely that the voter will cast a strategic vote for a (barely) secondpreferred alternative. Solving for equilibrium strategies in this situation-essentially a three-alternative election under approval voting-is beyond the scope of this paper.
For results concerning voting equilibria in three-alternative elections under plurality rule see Palfrey (1984) and Lian (1990) . See Brams and Fishburn (1991) for further discussion of strategic considerations under approval voting.
12. Unlike Proposition J, which would have imposed numerical ceilings on new construction permits, the new measure sponsored by PLAN calls for developers to pay impact fees, to pay prevailing wages to construction workers, and to undertake whatever mitigation measures the City determines are necessary to offset increases in traffic and water use. According to Gyourko (1991) 
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This means that we can use l/Np(l -p), where N is the number of votes cast in the district, as an estimate of the variance. We therefore estimate our equations using the weight w = (np(l -p))
